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Abstract
This paper studies a model of public policy with heterogenous citi-
zens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) is chosen directly by an
elected policymaker, and the other (pollution) depends stochastically
on the amount of roads. Both a one-country and a two-country version
of the model are analyzed, the latter displaying externalities across the
countries which creates incentives for free riding and strategic delega-
tion. The welfare eﬀects of providing the policymaker with information
about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated,
and it is shown that more information hurts some – sometimes even
all – citizens. In particular, the absence of an institution for informa-
tion gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, helping
it avoid the free-riding problem. Implications for the welfare eﬀects of
“informational lobbying” are discussed. //[Doc: Better-oﬀ-11.tex]//
JEL classiﬁcation: D69, D78, D89
Keywords: Public information acquisition; Value of information; Wel-
fare; Interest groups; Informational lobbying; Strategic delegation
∗Correspondence to: Johan Lagerlöf, WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Ger-
many. E-mail: Lagerloef@medea.wz-berlin.de. I have beneﬁted from helpful comments
from two anonymous referees, the editor Christian Schultz, Jonas Björnerstedt, Steve
Coate, Yeongjae Kang, Kai Konrad, Nippe Lagerlöf, Susanne Lohmann, César Martinelli,
Björn Persson, David Sundén, Karl Wärneryd, Jörgen Weibull, Zhentang Zhang, Christine
Zulehner, and participants at the 8th Annual WZB Conference 1999. Financial support
from Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius’ Foundation and the European Commission (con-
tracts no. ERBFMRXCT980203 and HPRN-CT-2000-00061) is gratefully acknowledged.I. Introduction
Information, or lack thereof, plays an important role in many political pro-
cesses. Indeed, often public policy must be decided on without full infor-
mation about the consequences of diﬀerent policy alternatives.1 There are,
however, several ways through which governments actively try to acquire
policy-relevant information prior to their decisions. For example, most gov-
ernments provide funding of applied research, and they do this regularly
and on a long term basis; in many countries there exist public agencies
like the US Census Bureau, which have the task of gathering statistics; in
some countries, like Sweden, traditions have developed that require interest
groups to be invited to provide information and give opinions on a matter
before it is decided. Information is also gathered on a more day-to-day ba-
sis: governments that face an important decision often commission reports
and investigations by experts and special committees.2 Moreover, even when
governments do not themselves actively try to acquire information, it is often
provided to them by interest groups and lobbyists (so-called informational
lobbying).
It may be natural to presume that as long as such public information
acquisition is not requiring too much resources, it is socially desirable. Af-
ter all, access to relevant information is often useful when making political
decisions. In a society where citizens have conﬂicting preferences, however,
it is not clear whether all of them are better oﬀ if public policy is made
with access to more information. Likewise, when a government is making
its decisions in a strategic environment, more information is not necessarily
1For example, the information that is lacking could concern questions such as: What
are the eﬀects of a membership in the EMU on growth and unemployment? What are the
eﬀects of a new tax system on the income distribution and the incentives for becoming an
industrial entrepreneur? What are the eﬀects on the environment and economic growth
of increased investment in the infrastructure?
2Larsson (1994, p. 180) writes the following about the use of royal commissions in
Sweden: “Almost every government bill of any importance that is presented to Parliament
has been developed in one or more royal commissions. The use of royal commissions has
decreased somewhat in recent years, but nevertheless about two hundred royal commissions
are at work every year. (...) Interest groups, agencies, and representatives of boards are
often invited to sit on these, as are politicians from the parliamentary opposition.”
1beneﬁcial. If some citizens indeed are worse oﬀ when the policymaker gets
access to more information, this is important to understand for at least two
reasons. First, it may help to explain why there sometimes are conﬂicting
views on whether governments should gather more information prior to de-
cisions on public policy.3 Second, as argued above, the information that the
policymaker gets access to is in many cases generated through “informa-
tional lobbying” – that is, strategic information transmission on the part
of interest groups that try to inﬂuence public policy.4 In order to under-
stand the welfare eﬀects of such lobbying, it is crucial to know how more
informed decisions on public policy aﬀect the welfare of diﬀerent citizens.
Will all citizens really be better oﬀ, and who are the winners and who are
the losers?
This paper tries to shed light on these questions by studying a relatively
simple linear-quadratic model of public policy under uncertainty. In the
model there are a large number of citizens with (quadratic) preferences over
the amount of roads and pollution in their country. The citizens are het-
erogenous with respect to how important roads are relative to pollution. A
policymaker decides directly only on the amount of roads, although indi-
rectly this decision aﬀects (in a linear fashion) also the amount of pollution:
more roads give rise to more pollution.5 The exact relationship between
roads and pollution is unknown, though. The policymaker is elected by the
citizens, where potential policymakers have preferences of the same form as
the citizens and with varying relative weights on roads and pollution. After
the policymaker has been elected and taken oﬃce, she ﬁrst observes a noisy
signal about the true state and then decides on the amount of roads.
3Another possible explanation for this phenomenon is that asking for more investiga-
tions may be a way of delaying and perhaps even stop the proposed project.
4Two early papers in the literature on informational lobbying are Austen-Smith and
Wright (1992) and Potters and van Winden (1992); surveys can be found in Austen-Smith
(1997) and Grossman and Helpman (2001). Typically, in the equilibria of the models in
this literature, at least some information is transmitted to the policymaker. This is due to
the assumptions that the policymaker is suﬃciently sophisticated and that the interests
of the lobbyist and the policymaker are not too disaligned (or, alternatively, that false
reports can at least with some probability be discovered and punished).
5This assumption is made for simplicity. Of course, in the real world the relationship
between roads and pollution might be more complex.
2Clearly, a citizen who could decide on the amount of roads herself (e.g.,
because she knew that she would be elected policymaker) would prefer to
have access to a signal with a quality that is as high as possible (provided a
higher quality is not costly per se, which I assume is the case here). In the
political setting sketched above, however, some citizens would (from an ex
ante perspective) be worse oﬀ if the policymaker had access to a signal with
higher quality. In particular, this will be the case for those citizens who care
the least about the environment. The reason why these citizens are worse oﬀ
is that they have a concave utility function, which makes uncertainty costly.
Moreover, even though the policymaker’s getting more information decreases
ex post uncertainty, it also increases ex ante uncertainty. The latter is
true because at the time when the welfare evaluation is made, the signal
to be received by the policymaker is not known. The ex ante uncertainty
manifests itself in a greater variability in the decision on the amount of
roads. Therefore, the presence of this uncertainty has an adverse eﬀect also
on the welfare of those citizens who care very little about the environment.
Indeed, for those citizens whose concern about the environment is suﬃciently
small, the adverse welfare eﬀect of a greater ex ante uncertainty dominates
the positive welfare eﬀect of a smaller ex post uncertainty. A majority of
citizens, however, including the median citizen, are always in favor of the
policymaker’s getting access to more information.
The model discussed above is also extended to allow for two countries,
each of which elects a policymaker who is to choose the amount of roads
in the own country. The total amount of roads determines, in a stochastic
fashion, the amount of (global) pollution aﬀecting both countries. Because
of the externality, the electorates of the two countries elect policymakers
who care less about the environment than do the median citizens. In this
version of the model, if the median citizens of the countries care suﬃciently
much about the environment, a majority of citizens of one of the countries
are worse oﬀ when the own policymaker gets access to information, given
that also the other country’s policymaker has access to information – it
can even be the case that all citizens are worse oﬀ.
3The reason why a majority prefers the own policymaker to be unin-
formed is that if both policymakers were informed (and if this were common
knowledge), then this would increase the amount of ex ante uncertainty, just
as in the one-country model. Moreover, and in contrast to that model, the
amount of ex post uncertainty would decrease only moderately or possibly
even increase. This is because of the incentives to delegate: if both policy-
makers were informed, then the elected policymakers would care relatively
little about the environment and thus make their decisions on roads, from the
median citizen’s point of view, too unresponsive to the information. Hence,
a country’s choice not to build an institution that provides its policymaker
with policy-relevant information can serve as a commitment device, helping
it avoid a situation where the countries delegate to policymakers who care
too little about the environment.
This paper is related to a literature on the value information in economic
environments. A number of authors have provided examples of non-zero sum
games where a player is hurt by having more information herself,p r o v i d e d
that this fact is common knowledge among the players.6 For examples of
this phenomenon in a political framework, see Reed (1989) or, in a Cournot
duopoly setting, e.g., Sakai (1985). There are also papers that study the
value of information being publicly known among a group of individuals.7
The present paper, in contrast, addresses the question whether the citizens
of a society are hurt if someone else (a policymaker) gets access to more in-
formation upon which she can act, a question which is particularly relevant
for the study of the welfare eﬀects of informational lobbying in a heteroge-
nous society.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the one-
6Ponssard (1976) shows that additional information can never be detrimental to a
player in a zero-sum game. It is also quite obvious that in a single-agent decision problem,
more information can never hurt.
7For example, see Hirschleifer (1971), Gersbach (1991), and Heidhues and Lagerlöf
(2001). Heidhues and Lagerlöf develop a model of electoral competition in which private
information is dispersed between two political candidates. The authors show that the
electorate can be worse oﬀ when the prior information that is publicly available becomes
more accurate. The reason for this is that, when the prior becomes more accurate, the
candidates’ incentives to truthfully transmit their additional private information to the
electorate are weakened.
4country model is presented and analyzed. Section III considers the extension
with two countries. Section IV summarizes the results and at the same time
discusses their implications for the welfare eﬀects of informational lobbying.
Proofs are found in an appendix.
II. One Country
Model
Consider a society with a continuum of citizens who are each having pref-
erences over two public goods, provided in quantities x ∈ < and y ∈ <.
Citizen i’s preferences are described by the von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function
Ui (x,y)=−(x − x)
2 − 2kλi (x − x)(y − y) − λi (y − y)
2 , (1)
where x, y, k,a n dλi are ﬁxed parameters. The citizens diﬀer from each other
only with regard to the parameter λi.T h eλi’s are continuously distributed
on [0,Γ] for some Γ > 0,8 and the median λi is denoted λm.O f c o u r s e ,
for any λi > 0,w ew a n tt oi n t e r p r e tt h ep a i ro fq u a n t i t i e s(x,y) as citizen
i’s ideal point. For this interpretation to make sense, however, we must
have Ui (x,y) >U i (x,y) for all (x,y) 6=( x,y). This is true if and only if
λi > 0 and λik2 < 1.9 Motivated by this, I impose the following assumption
throughout this section:
Assumption 1. Γk2 < 1.
Notice that citizen i’s preferences are separable across the two public
goods only if k =0 .I fk is positive, then there is a negative complementarity
between the two goods; that is, if k>0 and if y is greater than y,t h e na
citizen’s preferred level of x is smaller than x. Similarly, if k is negative
there is a positive complementarity: if y is greater than y, then a citizen’s
preferred level of x is greater than x.
8We can have Γ = ∞ if we also set k =0 ; cf. Assumption 1 below.
9See e.g. Sydsæter and Hammond (1995, Ch. 15.8).
5Public policy is decided on by a representative, who is elected by the cit-
izens. The representative can control only x. There is, however, a stochastic
relationship between x and y,g i v e nb y
y = βx − ε. (2)
Here β > 0 is a ﬁxed parameter and ε is a stochastic variable with zero
mean. We may think of x as the amount of roads in the country, and y
as the amount of pollution caused by the traﬃc on these roads (or perhaps
rather the adverse environmental eﬀects of the pollution). Everybody has
some ideal amount of roads, x, and some ideal amount of pollution, y.
The uncertainty as to the exact relationship between the amount of roads
and pollution may be due to the fact that the technology giving rise to
the relationship is not perfectly known, or to the fact that the amount of
pollution also depends on weather conditions which are not known at the
time when the decision on x must be made.
Substituting (2) into (1) yields citizen i’s induced preferences over x
only:
ui (x,ε)=−(x − x)
2 − 2kλi (x − x)(βx − ε − y) − λi (βx − ε − y)
2 . (3)
This means that if ε were known, citizen i would like the representative to
set x equal to b x = ψ (λi)+ϕ(λi)ε,w h e r e
ψ(λi) ≡
x(1 + kβλi)+yλi (k + β)
1+2 kβλi + λiβ2 , (4)
ϕ(λi) ≡
λi (k + β)
1+2 kβλi + λiβ2. (5)





Assumption 2 guarantees that the above expressions are well deﬁned
and the second-order condition to the problem of maximizing ui (x,ε) with
respect to x is satisﬁed. Since ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ
0
> 0, the parameter λi
6measures how responsive a citizen is to changes in ε. Someone who has a
low λi (i.e., someone who cares relatively little about pollution) would like
the representative to make x contingent on ε to a lesser degree than someone
for whom λi is large. In the following, the parameter λi will often be called
citizen i’s responsiveness parameter.10
T h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s . ( i )T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ei se l e c t e d .
( i i )T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v eo b s e r v e sas i g n a ls, which is correlated with ε,a n d
then chooses x. (iii) The shock ε is realized. The election at stage (i) works
as follows. The elected representative is assumed to be a citizen having a
responsiveness parameter λi such that she cannot be beaten in a pair-wise
comparison when each citizen votes for the one of the two candidates who
gives her the highest expected utility. In other words, the representative is
a Condorcet winner among the citizens.
It is assumed that the signal s and the shock ε are jointly distributed
according to the density function f (ε,s). Moreover, the expected value of ε
equals zero and the expected value of s is denoted µs;t h ev a r i a n c e so fε and
s are denoted σ2 and σ2
s, respectively. The correlation coeﬃcient between s
and ε is deﬁned by ρ = Cov(ε,s)/(σσs),w h e r eρ is assumed to be distinct
from zero: ρ ∈ [−1,0) ∪ (0,1].
It is further assumed that the distribution of s and ε is such that ε
has linear regression with regard to s;t h a ti s ,E (ε | s),w h e r eE (ε | s) ≡
R
εf (ε | s)dε is the conditional expectation function, is a linear (aﬃne) func-
tion of s.11 It is well known that if ε h a sl i n e a rr e g r e s s i o nw i t hr e g a r dt os
(and if E (ε)=0 ), then
E (ε | s)=ρ
σ
σs
(s − µs). (6)
10This kind of heterogeneity is also found in the models of, for example, Melumad
and Shibano (1991), Lagerlöf (1997), and Schultz (2002). In those papers, however, the
heterogeneity is simply postulated when specifying the functional form. Here, in contrast,
the heterogeneity is derived from diﬀerences in the relative weights on two policy issues
and the stochastic relationship between them. Moreover, the relationship between the
representative’s and the median citizen’s responsiveness is endogenous to the model.
11For instance, a bivariate normal distribution has this property.
7Analysis
Let us denote the representative’s responsiveness parameter by λr. At stage
(ii), conditional on having observed the signal s, the representative will




ur (x,ε)f (ε | s)dε. (7)
The unique solution to this problem is given by
x∗
r = ψ(λr)+ϕ(λr)E (ε | s). (8)
Now consider a citizen/voter. At the time of the election, this person
only knows the prior distribution of s and ε. She anticipates, however, that
a representative with responsiveness parameter λr will set x equal to x∗
r.
Hence, citizen i’s expected utility at the time of the election, denoted by







1+2 kβλi + λiβ2¢£




1+2 kβλi + λiβ2¢
ρ2σ2 £
ϕ2 (λr) − 2ϕ(λr)ϕ(λi)
¤
−x2 − 2kλixy − λiσ2 − λiy2 (9)
T h ee x p r e s s i o na f t e rt h es e c o n de q u a l i t ys i g ni ne q u a t i o n( 9 )w a so b t a i n e d
by using equations (3), (6), (8), and by carrying out some algebra.
The function Eui represents citizen i’s preferences over a potential rep-
resentative. The potential representatives diﬀer from each other along only
one dimension, λr ∈ [0,Γ]. Moreover, in the proof of Lemma 1 below it is
shown that Eui is single peaked in λr. Hence, we can invoke the median
voter theorem (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000), which states that if
those two conditions (i.e., one dimension and single-peakedness) are met
then the median voter’s favorite representative cannot lose under majority
rule. This means that, in a political equilibrium, the representative will be
the favorite of the median citizen/voter. Unsurprisingly, the responsiveness
parameter of this favorite representative equals the median voter’s, λr = λm;
8there is no reason for any member of the electorate to delegate the task of
deciding on public policy to someone with other preferences than herself.12
Lemma 1. The representative’s responsiveness parameter is the same as
the median citizen’s, λr = λm.
Welfare Eﬀects of More Information
Let us now investigate whether members of the society would be better oﬀ
if the representative got access to a signal with higher quality. The welfare
evaluation will be made ex ante; that is, I will consider citizen i’s expected
utility, as measured by Eui in equation (9) (with λr = λm). The expression
“higher quality” will be understood as an increase in ρ2.
Let e λ be deﬁned by
e λ =
λm
2+2 kβλm + λmβ2. (10)
Proposition 1. An increase in ρ2 beneﬁts those with λi > e λ and makes
those with λi < e λ worse oﬀ (i.e., ∂Eui
∂ρ2 |λr=λmR 0 as λi R e λ).
Accordingly, those members of the electorate who have a suﬃciently low
responsiveness parameter λi are worse oﬀ if the representative gets access to
better information about the relationship between the amount of roads and
the amount of pollution, in the sense that ρ2 increases. Before looking at the
intuition for this result, let us consider the question whether the majority
of citizens may be worse oﬀ from an increase in ρ2.S i n c ee λ < λm/2 (this
follows from equation (10) and Assumption 2), it follows immediately that
the answer to this question is no: everyone with a responsiveness parameter
λi ∈ [λm/2,Γ] is strictly better oﬀ from a larger ρ2, and this group of citizens
form a majority.
In order to understand the intuition behind the result that those citizens
who have a low responsiveness parameter are worse oﬀ if the signal quality
12In Lagerlöf (2001), a model that is similar to the present one is used to study monetary
policy and the optimal choice of a central banker. In that model, however, the signal
quality ρ
2 is endogenous: the appointed banker can, by incurring a private cost, choose
a higher signal quality. This possibility creates an incentive to delegate to a relatively
“liberal” banker.
9ρ2 becomes larger, it is useful to look at how the diﬀerent terms in the
expression for citizen i’s expected utility are aﬀected by an increase in ρ2.
Of course, if λi =0 , then the expected utility is independent of ρ2.L e tu s
suppose that λi > 0. Then it turns out that an increase in ρ2 has the eﬀects
that are indicated in the following equation:
Eui (x∗
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That is, whereas the third term of citizen i’s expected utility is increasing
in ρ2,t h eﬁrst term is decreasing in ρ2; the second term is increasing in ρ2
if there is a negative complementarity or a strong positive complementarity.
Hence, it is from the ﬁrst (and sometimes also the second) term that the cost
of having a more informed representative comes. The reason why the ﬁrst
term is decreasing in ρ2 is that it gets smaller (which means lower utility)
when the representative’s decision x∗
m varies more, and x∗
m will indeed vary
more when the signal quality ρ2 increases. In other words, a better informed
representative will make her decision contingent on ε to a greater extent,
which is bad for the citizen since her preferences are concave.
Stated diﬀerently, whereas the ex post uncertainty decreases when the
representative gets access to a signal with higher quality, the ex ante uncer-
tainty increases. The decrease in ex post uncertainty is of course beneﬁcial
for all citizens for whom λi > 0;t h i si sr e ﬂected in the fact that the third
term in citizen i’s expected utility is increasing in ρ2. For those citizens
for whom λi is small enough (smaller than e λ according to the algebra), the
positive welfare eﬀect of a lower ex post uncertainty is dominated by the
adverse welfare eﬀect of a larger ex ante uncertainty.13
13The intuition for the result in Proposition 1 is related to the intuition for a result
10III. Two Countries
Model
Let us now assume that there are two countries, indexed by j ∈ {1,2},e a c h
with a continuum of citizens. The preferences of citizen i of country j are
described by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function Uij (xj,y)=
−x2
j − λijy2,w h e r exj ∈ < is the quantity of a public good speciﬁcf o r
country j ( e . g . ,t h ea m o u n to fr o a d si nt h a tc o u n t r y )a n dy ∈ < is the
quantity of a public good common for the two countries (e.g., the amount
of global pollution). The parameter λij ∈ [0,∞) is a weight for citizen i in
country j; the median λij is the same in both countries and denoted λm.
(Relative to the model in the previous section, I thus simplify by setting
k = x = y =0and Γ = ∞.) The amount of pollution, y, is determined by
the following relationship:
y = β (x1 + x2) − ε,
where, as before, β is a ﬁxed parameter and ε is a stochastic variable with
zero mean. The induced preferences of citizen i of country j are thus given
by
uij (x1,x 2,ε)=−x2
j − λij [β (x1 + x2) − ε]
2 . (12)
The sequence of events is as follows. (i) Each country elects a repre-
sentative. (ii) The representative of each country j ﬁrst learns about the
outcome of the election in the other country. She then observes a signal s,
which is correlated with ε. (The representatives are thus assumed to observe
the same signal s, which means that they have access to exactly the same
information.14) Thereafter, simultaneously with the other representative,
in Freixas and Kihlstrom (1984). These authors consider a situation in which a patient
must choose a doctor in the face of imperfect information about the distribution of service
quality across doctors. In particular they study the eﬀe c to fr i s ka v e r s i o no nd e m a n df o r
information about this distribution. They ﬁnd that, in their model, an increase in the
degree of risk aversion unambiguously reduces the demand for information.
14An alternative assumption would be to say that the representatives observe signals
that are not perfectly correlated (for example, independent conditionally on ε). The
assumption of perfect correlation simpliﬁes the analysis and the exposition considerably,
however. I would expect qualitatively unaltered results in a model with conditionally
independent or otherwise imperfectly correlated signals.
11she chooses xj. (iii) The shock ε is realized.
The way in which the election of a representative in country j works is
similar to before. In particular, a political equilibrium at stage (i) is deﬁned
as a pair (λ∗
r1,λ∗
r2) such that each λ∗
rj is a Condorcet winner in country j,
given that the other representative’s responsiveness parameter equals λ∗
rl.
Formally, denoting a Condorcet winner in country j given some λrl (for








The rest of the model and the notation is the same as in the previous
section. In particular, the signal technology is identical to the previous
one (recall that the representatives observe the same signal s), and the
relationship (6) will be used extensively here, too.
Analysis
Let us begin the analysis by solving the game between the two representa-
tives at stage (ii). Given that she has observed the signal s, the representa-
tive of country j maximizes E {urj (x1,x 2,ε) | s} with respect to xj,w h i l e
taking the other representative’s strategy as given. The ﬁrst-order condition
for this problem is
−xj − λrjβ [β (x1 + x2) − E (ε | s)] = 0,
which means that the two representatives’ ﬁrst-order conditions form an
equation system that is linear in x1 and x2. Solving for this yields the
unique solution x∗
j = B∗




1+β2 (λr1 + λr2)
. (13)
Let us now turn to stage (i). Given the equilibrium behavior at stage (ii)
and some pair of responsiveness parameters (λr1,λr2), the expected utility

























12where the arguments of B∗
1 and B∗
2 have been suppressed. The second line of
this expression was obtained by using (6), (12), and x∗
j = B∗
j (λr1,λr2)E (ε | s),
and then performing some straightforward algebra.
Similarly to the previous section, Euij (λr1,λr2) can be shown to be sin-
gle peaked in λrj (see the proof of Lemma 2). Hence, a Condorcet winner
in country j exists and coincides with the favorite of a citizen/voter with
λij = λm. This, in turn, means that the set of political equilibria at stage
(i) coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of a game where the two me-
dian voters simultaneously choose the own representative’s responsiveness
parameter and get the payoﬀs Eum1 (λr1,λr2) and Eum2 (λr1,λr2), respec-
tively. Solving for this set of Nash equilibria yields the following result.












As one would expect, λ∗
r is increasing in λm. Moreover, we have ∂λ∗
r/∂β <
0 with limβ→0 λ∗
r = λm and limβ→∞ λ∗
r =0 .15 That is, the two electorates
delegate the task of deciding on the amount of roads to representatives who
care less than the median citizens about the environment, and the incentives
to do this are stronger the larger is the parameter β.
The fundamental reason why λ∗
r < λm is that the representatives’ strate-
gic variables at stage (ii), x1 and x2, are strategic substitutes (see Bulow,
Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985): an increase in xl (for l 6= j) decreases
representative j’s marginal utility. Intuitively, if a representative expects
the other representative to contribute only a little or not at all to the public
good of making xj suﬃciently responsive to the signal, her best response is
to contribute a relatively large amount herself (and vice versa). Because of
this, the median citizen of a country can gain by, at stage (i), choose a repre-
sentative who is relatively unwilling to contribute to the public good. Both













. From this expression
it is easily seen that the claims are true.
13electorates have this incentive, and as the parameter β – which measures
to what degree an increase in the amount of roads leads to an increase in the
amount of pollution – becomes very large, cutthroat competition between
the countries leads to an equilibrium λ∗
r that is close to zero.16
Welfare Eﬀects of More Information
Let us now ask how the welfare of the citizens is aﬀected when their represen-
tative gets access to more information. In contrast to the previous section,
here I will not do comparative statics on the signal quality ρ2.I n s t e a dIw i l l
simply compare the ex ante welfare level in the equilibrium of the model
above with the ex ante welfare levels in the following three benchmarks: (1)
the other country but not the own having access to a signal; (2) the own
country but not the other having access to a signal; and (3) none of the
countries having access to a signal. Moreover, rather than considering the
expected welfare of any arbitrary citizen, I will, initially, look only at the
expected welfare of the median citizen.
Suppose that both representatives have access to the signal, so that in
equilibrium xj = B∗
j (λr1,λr2)E (ε | s) and (λr1,λr2)=( λ∗
r,λ∗
r). Then the













¢ − λmσ2. (16)
If instead none of the representatives had access to a signal, then they would
set xj =0(i.e., they would behave as if λrj =0 ) and the median citizen’s
expected utility would be given by Eumj (0,0) = −λmσ2. Similarly, if only
16It may be illuminating to compare this result with the one of Persson and Tabellini
(1992; 2000, Ch. 12.4.4). They develop a model of tax competition between two countries,
where the chosen tax rates on capital (the mobile tax base) are ineﬃciently low. At a prior
stage, however, the electorates of the two countries delegate to representatives who have
a relatively strong incentive to tax capital, which mitigates the ineﬃciency. The reason
why strategic delegation has this positive eﬀect on the outcome in their model is that
the strategic variables of the representatives in the tax competition game are strategic
complements: if a representative expects the other representative to set a high tax, her
best response is to set a relatively high tax, too.
For references to other related work on strategic delegation, see Persson and Tabellini
(2000). See also Putnam (1988) for an inﬂuential paper in the political science literature
on the interaction between domestic politics and international relations.
14the representative of country 1 (respectively, country 2) had access to a
signal, then the expected utility of the median citizen of country 1 would be














¢2 − λmσ2. (18)
(Eqs. (16)-(18) were obtained by using (13)-(15) and then carrying out some
algebra.)
It is easy to see that Eum1 (0,0) <E u m1 (λm,0) and Eum1 (λm,0) <
Eum1 (0,λm). That is, the median citizen of a country prefers the own
country’s representative to have access to a signal rather than none of the
representatives’ having access to a signal. And, given that only one of the
representatives has access to a signal, the median citizen prefers this to be
the representative of the other country. The following result tells us how
Eum1 (λ∗
r,λ∗
r) relates to the three other expected welfare levels.
Lemma 3. We have Eum1 (λ∗
r,λ∗
r) >E u m1 (λm,0) for all β, λm, σ2,a n d
ρ2.M o r e o v e r , Eum1 (λ∗
r,λ∗
r) >E u m1 (0,λm) ⇔ β2λm <c≈ .68









r) <E u m1 (0,λm). (19)
In words, for λm and/or β suﬃciently large, the median voter of one of the
countries, say country 1, is better oﬀ if the own representative does not have
access to a signal, given that the other country’s representative does. As we
will see, the same is true for those citizens of country 1 with λi1 < λm.
17Recall from the previous section that if there is only one country (or, which here
amounts to the same, if the other country’s representative does not have access to a
signal), then there is no reason to delegate strategically: λr = λm.
15To understand why we get this result, consider again the expression for
Euij (λr1,λr2) in (14), and suppose for concreteness that j =1 .W es e et h a t
the ﬁrst term of Eui1 (λr1,λr2) is a function of B∗
1 only, and it is maximized
at B∗
1 =0 . Hence, this term is obviously larger with (λr1,λr2)=( 0 ,λm) than
with (λr1,λr2)=( λ∗
r,λ∗
r). The possible beneﬁtw i t h(λ∗
r,λ∗
r) comes from the
second term, which is a function of the sum (B∗
1 + B∗
2); in particular, this
term is single peaked in (B∗
1 + B∗


























Both these expressions are strictly smaller than 1/β. Hence, if (20) is smaller
(and thus farther away from the peak 1/β) than (21), there is in fact no
beneﬁta ta l lw i t h(λ∗
r,λ∗
r): both terms of Eui1 (λr1,λr2) are then larger
with (0,λm). Indeed, one can verify that (20) is smaller than or equal to
(21) if and only if β2λm ≥ 2,i nw h i c hc a s eall citizens of country 1 prefer
(0,λm) to (λ∗
r,λ∗
r)!I f β2λm < 2, however, the second term is larger with
(λ∗
r,λ∗
r) than with (0,λm), and whether a citizen of country 1 prefers the
own representative to be informed, given that also the other representative
is informed, depends on the magnitude of the weight λi1; the algebra shows
that, for the median citizen of country 1, the critical level of λm is given by
λm = c/β2 (see the proof of Lemma 3).
So the reason why we obtain the relationship in (19) is that, from the
median citizen’s point of view, there is too little stabilization of the pol-
lution shocks when both representatives have access to information. The
reason for this, in turn, is twofold. First, for given representatives, there
is a free-riding problem in the choice whether to make xj suﬃciently re-
sponsive to the signal. Second, anticipating this, the electorates of the two
countries elect representatives who care less than the median citizens about
the environment, thus making the free-riding problem even worse (cf. the
16discussion following Lemma 2). The outcome of this cutthroat competion
between the countries becomes more extreme the larger is β,w h i c hi sw h y
we need β2λm >cfor the relationship in (19) to hold.
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. A majority of citizens in a country always want the own
representative to have access to information, given that the other coun-
try’s representative does not. If the other country’s representative does
have access to information, however, a majority of citizens want the
own representative not to have acess to information if λm >c / β2
(where c ≈ .68), and for λm ≥ 2/β2 all citizens agree on this.
Thus, if λm >c / β2 and, at the outset of the game, in each country there
was a referendum about whether the own representative should get access
to an informative signal (and if the outcomes of the referenda then became
commonly known), then this extended game would have two asymmetric
equilibria: “no information” winning in country 1 but not in country 2,
and vice versa.18 For the median voter in the country that does let its
representative have access to information, however, the equilibrium outcome




Imagine that a society has a choice between putting a ban on lobbying or
not, where “lobbying,” if it is permitted, provides the political leadership
with policy-relevant information prior to its decision on public policy. Will
such lobbying make all citizens better oﬀ? If not, who will be the winners
and who will be the losers?
This paper has investigated these questions within the framework of a
relatively simple model of public policy under uncertainty and with two
public goods: roads and pollution, where roads is chosen directly by an
elected policymaker and the amount of pollution depends stochastically on
18There would also be a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies.
17the amount of roads. In a one-country version of this model, it was shown
that the majority of citizens are always better oﬀ from lobbying in the above
sense. A minority, however, consisting of those citizens who care the least
about the environment, are in favor of a ban on lobbying. The reason is
that, if the policymaker makes her decision contingent on the information,
ex ante uncertainty increases, and, for those citizens whose concern about
the environment is relatively small, the increase in ex ante uncertainty carries
a heavier weight than the reduction in ex post uncertainty.
In a two-country version of the model a majority of citizens of one of the
countries can be against lobbying, provided that lobbying is allowed in the
other country (or that the policymaker of that country has access to infor-
mation through some other channel). The reason is that if lobbying were
allowed in both countries, the two policymakers would face a free-riding
problem in their decisions whether to make the amount of roads suﬃciently
responsive to their information. As a consequence, the two electorates del-
egate strategically the task of deciding on roads to policymakers who care
less about the environment than do the median citizens. When this eﬀect
is suﬃciently strong, the two policymakers care so little about the environ-
ment and make their decisions so unresponsive to the information that the
median citizen of one of the countries (as well as all those citizens who care
less about the environment than her) prefer the own policymaker not to have
access to information. In short, the absence of an institution for information
gathering – here informational lobbying – serves as a commitment device
for a country and helps it avoid the free-riding problem.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
To be able to invoke the median voter theorem one must show that Eui is





1+2 kβ + λiβ2¢h
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0






It is easy to check that ϕ
0
> 0 and that ψ
0
has the same sign as (y − βx).




∂λr > 0 for any λr < λi, ∂Eui
∂λr < 0 for any λr > λi,a n d∂Eui
∂λr =0for
λr = λi. Hence, Eui is single peaked in λr,a n dt h ep e a ki sa tλr = λi. ¤
B. Proof of Proposition 1




1+2 kβ + λiβ2¢
σ2ϕ(λm)[ϕ(λm) − 2ϕ(λi)], (A2)
which has the same sign as (2ϕ(λi) − ϕ(λm)).B yu s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of ϕ
and by carrying out some algebra, one may show that (2ϕ(λi) − ϕ(λm)) in
turn has the same sign as
³
λi − e λ
´
. ¤
C. Proof of Lemma 2































1+β2 (λr1 + λr2)
¤3 . (A3)
By inspecting (A3), it is easy to see that Euij is single peaked in λrj with the




. Having established this, let us look for the
Nash equilibria of the game between the two median voters. First notice that
for λij = λm > 0 and λrj =0 , ∂Eumj/∂λrj is strictly positive for all λrl ≥ 0.
Hence, in any equilibrium we must have λr1,λr2 > 0.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w em u s t
have ∂Eumj/∂λrj =0for the median voter of both countries. Subtracting
one of these ﬁrst-order conditions from the other and then rewriting yield
λr1 = λr2, so any equilibrium must be symmetric. Setting λr1 = λr2 = λ∗
r in
∂Eumj/∂λrj =0and then simplifying, we get the expression in (15) (there
is also a second root which is negative and thus irrelevant). ¤
19D. Proof of Lemma 3


















































> 0. This inequality




> 0 for all β2λm > 0. Next,
using (16) and (18), we can write Eum1 (λ∗
r,λ∗
















































< 2. It is easy to see that there is
a unique strictly positive value of β2λm,s a yc, below which the inequality
holds and above which it does not. The critical value c must thus be the




=2 .S o l v i n gf o rc using Maple yields
c ≈ .68. ¤
References
Austen-Smith, D. (1997), Interest groups: Money, Information, and In-
ﬂuence. In: D. C. Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A
Handbook. Cambridge University Press, pp. 296-321.
20Austen-Smith, D. and Wright, J. R. (1992), Competitive Lobbying for a
Legislator’s Vote. Social Choice and Welfare 9, 229-257.
Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., and Klemperer, P. D. (1985), Multimar-
ket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements. Journal of
Political Economy 93, 488-511.
Freixas, X. and Kihlstrom, R. E. (1984), Risk Aversion and Information
D e m a n d .I n :M .B o y e ra n dR .E .K i h l s t r o m( E d s . ) ,Bayesian models
in economic theory. North-Holland, pp. 93-104.
Gersbach, H. (1991), The Value of Public Information in Majority Deci-
sions. Economics Letters 35, 239-242.
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2001), Special Interest Politics.M I T
Press.
Heidhues, P. and Lagerlöf, J. (2001), Hiding Information in Electoral Com-
petition. Games and Economic Behavior,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Hirshleifer, J (1971), The Private and Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activity. American Economic Review 61, 561-
574.
Lagerlöf, J. (1997), Lobbying, Information, and Private and Social Welfare.
European Journal of Political Economy 13, 615-637.
Lagerlöf, J. (2001), Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a
“Liberal” Central Banker. Economics & Politics 13, 221-236.
Larsson, T. (1994), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government in
Sweden. In: M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle (Eds.), Cabinet Ministers
and Parliamentary Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 169-186.
Melumad, N. D. and Shibano, T. (1991), Communication in Settings with
No Transfers, RAND Journal of Economics 22, 173-198.
21Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1992), The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy
and European Integration. Review of Economic Studies 59, 689-701.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Eco-
nomic Policy. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
Ponssard, J.-P. (1976), On the Concept of the Value of Information in
Competitive Situations, Management Science 22, 739-747.
Potters, J. and van Winden, F. (1992), Lobbying and Asymmetric Infor-
mation. Public Choice 74, 269-292.
Putnam, R. D. (1988), Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games. International Organization 42, 427-460.
Reed, R. W. (1989), Information in Political Markets: A Little Knowledge
Can Be a Dangerous Thing, J o u r n a lo fL a w ,E c o n o m i c s ,a n dO r g a n i -
zation 5, 355-374.
Sakai, Y. (1985), The Value of Information in a Simple Duopoly Model,
Journal of Economic Theory 36, 36-54.
Schultz, C. (2002), Policy Biases with Voters’ Uncertainty about the Econ-
omy and the Government, European Economic Review 46, 487-506
Sydsæter, K. and Hammond, P. J. (1995), Mathematics for Economic Anal-
ysis. Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
22